The Rule of the Courts

Francisco Balaguer Callejón

unfold – we must differentiate between transitions and ruptures within periods of crisis 5 . A transition is a phase of crisis that acts as a bridge, taking us to a new situation that has already been prefigured. An example of this is the transition from the Legal to the Constitutional State during the 20th century. This was an important transformation within modern constitutionalism, but not a rupture, as it had already been foreshadowed by doctrinal and political debates during the interwar period. Contributing to this prior configuration were H. Kelsen’s ideas on the normativity of the constitution, constitutional justice and pluralist democracy 6 ; H. Heller’s on the social State 7 ; and F. Neumann’s on the economic constitution 8 , to name just a few relevant examples. The theoretical and doctrinal debates of the interwar period produced an image of the Constitutional State that was subsequently formalised in the German Grundgesetz of 1949 and the Italian Constitution of 1948 after the end of World War II. These documents are the foundation of the normative constitutional model that characterises the Constitutional State. In Kelsen’s conception, pluralism is incorporated into an open interpretation of law, whereby a unique interpretation of legal norms is impossible 9 . This has an impact on the work of the judiciary in applying the law, resulting in a 6 Cf. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre , 2nd edition, Verlag Franz Deuticke, Wien, reprint 1967. Cf. also H. Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie , 1920, Spanish version of the second edition, 1929, Esencia y valor de la democracia , Labor, Barcelona, 1934 and H. Kelsen, “La garantie juridictionnelle de la Constitution (La Justice constitutionnelle)”, 1928, Spanish version, Anuario Iberoamericano de Justicia Constitucional , n. 15, Madrid, 2011. 7 Cf. H. Heller, “Rechtsstaat oder Diktatur?”, 1929, Spanish version in Escritos políticos , Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1985. 8 Cf. F. Neumann, Über die Voraussetzungen und den Rechtsbegriff einer Wirtschaftsverfassung , 1931, Spanish version in Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo , n. 9/2008. 9 For H. Kelsen, the idea of establishing a single, correct interpretation of legal norms is, in effect, a mere fiction intended to maintain the ideal of legal certainty. In contrast, legal science should present the various meanings that can be derived from legal norms when interpreting them, leaving the decision regarding the intended meaning to the bodies responsible for applying the law. Cf. H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre , cit., p. 353. 5 Cf. F. Balaguer Callejón, “Crisi, transizioni e rotture. Sul futuro del costituzionalismo”, PasSaggi Costituzionali , Anno IV – Numero 2 – Dicembre 2024.

57