The Rule of the Courts

Francisco Balaguer Callejón

be maintained as long as the substantial homogeneity of the social groups that benefited from it persisted. While constitutional channels of access to the political process were closed to most of the population 23 , a homogeneous cultural context and a shared set of interests on the political space could manifest themselves through a unitary law, obeyed by all and faithfully applied – the sole expression of popular sovereignty. Conversely, when these channels are opened due to popular pressure, parliamentary law proves to be an insufficient instrument for determining the rules of coexistence among the various social groups 24 . The crisis of the law is the crisis of Parliament. As Duguit stated: “On a dressé les parlements élus contre le despotisme des rois ; il faut affirmer le droit intangible de l’individu contre le despotisme des parlements” 25 . The conflict between majorities and minorities, each advocating alternative projects for social organization, manifested itself with full force. 23 A significant example of how narrow these channels were can be seen in the restriction of suffrage and the delay in recognising universal suffrage. Cf. D. Nohlen, Wahlsysteme der Welt , 1978, Spanish version, Madrid, 1981, p. 59. Cf. also F. Carreras/J.M. Vallés, Las elecciones. Introducción a los sistemas electorales , Editorial Blume, Barcelona 1977, pp. 50-1. In Spain, for example, the electorate was reduced to 0.15% of the population in some 19th-century elections. Only in the 20th century, under the Second Republic, was universal suffrage fully implemented. Cf. J. Solé Tura/E. Aja, Constituciones y períodos constituyentes en España (1808-1936) Siglo XXI de España, Madrid, 1985, pp. 122 et sequ. Cf. also F. Carreras/J.M. Vallés, op. cit. , pp. 205 et seq. 24 Summarising the frequent criticisms of the law at that time, F. López de Oñate said: “S I verifica dunque un mutamento di pensiero e di atteggiamento circa i concetti giuridici fondamentali e soprattutto circa quello fondamentalissimo, che è il pernio intorno al quale si svolge l’esperienza giuridica, il concetto di legge. Contro la legge si rivolgono tutte le critiche, vibrate e vivaci e inesauribili, che il pensiero moderno ha diretto contro l’astratto e il generale, in favore dell’individuale storico, cioè del concreto (...). Sono stati obiettati i fatti contro il Codice , gli interessi , contro i concetti : espressioni varie di uno stesso pensiero che è quello anzidetto del diritto contro la legge ”, La certezza del diritto, 1942, reprint, Giuffrè Editore, 1968, pp. 38-9. 25 In his critique of parliamentarism, Duguit said: “s’il est un gouvernement contre l’arbitraire duquel il importe de prendre de sérieuses garanties, c’est le gouvernement populaire, parce que c’est celui qui a le plus de tendance á se croire omnipotent. On a dressé les parlements élus contre le despotisme des rois ; il faut affirmer le droit intangible de l’individu contre le despotisme des parlements” L. Duguit, Traité de Droit Constitutionnel, T. 1, Théorie générale de L’État , Fontemoing & Cie Éditeurs, Paris 1911, p. 29.

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