The Rule of the Courts

The algorithm that pronounces the words of the law

The rupture between the ideological tenets of liberalism and the reality derived from them was evident. The artificiality of these principles would be highlighted by early 20th century authors, when the explosion of pluralism and the development of political parties seriously threatened the liberal State 26 . It was after the Second World War that the new democratic consti tutions, beginning with those of Germany and Italy, embraced pluralist democracy, the normative force of the constitution, and the jurisdictional guarantees of the constitutional order. These principles brought about a significant transformation in a legal culture that could no longer be based on the idea of supposedly universal and unique reason, a notion incompatible with the recognition of social and political pluralism. Therefore, new elements will need to be developed in the construction of constitutionalism and constitutional law. This will also affect the position of judges in relation to the law, as they will change from having a null and subordinate role in the Legal State to having a fundamental role derived from the idea of pluralism. Pluralism demands agreements and requires consensus; pluralist democracy needs rules and control. Majorities must be controlled because the unlimited will of parliament is no longer permitted. Because, as the French theorists said, national sovereignty will not change 26 Thus, L. Duguit, who considers the principle of national sovereignty as unproven and unprovable and therefore as a useless postulate: “En vérité, quoi qu’on fasse, cette prétendue volonté générale ne s’exprime jamais qu’au moyen d’une majorité et la puissance publique, le pouvoir de commander appartient á une majorité qui impose sa volonté á une minorité”, Ibidem, p. 34. R. Carré de Malberg, for his part, indicated as “l’idée de souveraineté de la volonté générale a été exploitée en vue de fonder la puissance souveraine du Parlement lui-même”. R. Carré de Malberg, La Loi, expression de la volonté générale , 1931, reprint, Economica, Paris 1984, p. 215. According to J. Barthélemy/P. Duez, who believe that the theory of national sovereignty leads to the omnipotence and absolutism of Parliament and is dangerous for freedom: “Elle tend à faire de la volonté commune, de la volonté de la Nation, une volonté légitime en elle-même, qui serait l’expression même du droit et de la justice. Il y a en germe dans le principe de la souveraineté nationale, une prétention à légitimer le pouvoir par son origine. Dès lors, tout acte émanât de la souveraineté nationale serait, par le seul fait de son origine, régulier, conforme a droit ; la loi, par cela seul qu’elle serait la volonté de la Nation, serait quant à sa régularité et sa conformité au droit, mise au-dessus de toute discussion.”, J. Barthélemy/P. Duez Traité de Droit constitutionnel , 1933, reprint, Economica, Paris 1985, p. 76.

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